Lessons from Germany: Improving on the U.S. Model for Corporate Governance by Glaub, Tien
Brigham Young University International Law & Management
Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 4
5-1-2009
Lessons from Germany: Improving on the U.S.
Model for Corporate Governance
Tien Glaub
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Business
Organizations Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University International Law & Management Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tien Glaub, Lessons from Germany: Improving on the U.S. Model for Corporate Governance, 5 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. R. 235 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol5/iss2/4
Lessons from Germany: Improving on the U.S. 
Model for Corporate Governance 
Tien Glaub' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the collapse of Enron, a cloud of suspicion and mistrust has 
loomed over corporate America. 1 The Enron debacle proved to be 
just the tip of the corporate fraud iceberg.2 Evidence of fraud in all 
major industries exposed the "hidden fundamental weaknesses" of 
many American companies. 3 Enron's shareholders, typical of millions 
of defrauded investors, had no idea what was happening behind the 
scenes until the company's $90 stock became worthless.4 The 
scandals scarred both the lives of individual investors, who saw their 
wealth disappear overnight, and capital markets as a whole." 
These scandals highlighted the ineffectiveness of corporate 
governance rules throughout the United States. Since 200 I, the 
U.S. legislature and public have cried out for changes to corporate 
governance rules to prevent continued abuses.6 In response to the 
crisis, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the most 
significant public company securities legislation since the Securities 
Act anp the Securities Exchange Act of the 1930s? On the public 
* LLM candidate, The John Marshall Law School (2009). 
1. David S. Ruder, Lessons from Enron: Director & Lawyer Monitoring 
Responsibilities (Oct. 10, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.law.IH>rthwestern.edu/pr<lfessionaled/d(lCuments/Ruder_Lessons _Enron.pdf). 
2. Cherie J. Owen, Comment, Board Games: Germany's Monopoly on Two-Tier System 
o( Corporate GOJ'ernance and Why Post-En ron u.s. Would Benefit from Its Adoption, 22 PENN 
ST. INT'!. L. REV. 167, 169 (2003) (listing WoridCom, Adelphia, Tyco, Global Crossing, and 
K-Mart as other prominent examples). 
3. Carrie Johnson & Brooke A. Masters, Fraud Cases Focus on Top Executives, WASH. 
POST, Jan, 18,2005, at AOI. 
4. Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate & Securities Law After 
ElIron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 453-54 (2002). 
5. Del Quentin Wilber, Turbulence O,Jer Executive Pay: Airline Workers Question 
Leaders' Bonuses After Rank-and-File Pay Cuts, WASH. POST, May 22, 2007, at DOL 
6. See infra note 7. 
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002) (codified 
at scattered sections of 11,15,18,28, and 29 U.S.c.) (increasing accounting transparency of 
corporate audit systems, mandating independence in audits, setting ethical standards f(lr 
accounting and key executives, enhancing financial disclosure to prevent self~dealing, insider 
trading, abusive pension plans, and increasing liability f(lr t:lilure to comply). 
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side, the American Bar Association urged reform of the governance 
structure of American corporations and autonomy of the board of 
directors.s Some legal commentators advocated adoption of a 
modified version of the German two-tier board structure as the best 
model for corporate governance. l) Others remained loyal to the 
traditional one-tier board, after which the American corporate 
governance system is modeled. 10 
Based on the current post-Sarbanes-Oxley state of U.S. corporate 
governance, this Comment recommends American adoption of some 
characteristics of the German governance model and rejection of 
others. After a short historical background of comparative corporate 
governance, Part II recommends that the American board 
incorporate two components of the German model: its two-tier 
board structure and its externally controlled auditing procedure. Part 
III advocates that the American board diverge from the German 
model with regard to two other components by granting more 
authority to the supervIsory board and eliminating labor 
partICIpation in corporate governance. American corporate 
governance can be greatly improved through selective adoption of 
the German two-tier board structure and externally controlled 
auditing procedures, while further legislation can address concerns 
with the German model by increasing the authority of the 
supervisory board and eliminating labor participation. 
II. COMPONENTS OF THE GERMAN MODEL TO BE ADOPTED 
While the goal of any corporate governance scheme is to ensure 
the corporation's well being, considerable debate continues to exist 
over whether the German two-tier board is superior to the American 
one-tier system. II Rather than a wholesale adoption of the German 
two-tier board model, this Part suggests that the American board 
incorporate the German board structure and audit system and 
8. AMERICAN BAR ASSOClATION, PRELIMINARY REPORT 01' THE ABA TASK FORCE or-; 
COIU'ORATE RESPONSlllILITY, (2002), available at Imp:/ /www.abanet.org/buslaw/ 
c, lrporatnesp' ll1si bility / prdimary _rep' >n. pdf 
9. See Lauren J. Aste, Rejiwmincq French Corporate GIIl'ernance: A Return to the Two-
Tier Board', 32 GEO. WASI-1. J. INT'L L. & ECON. I (1999) (comparing dunges of tile French 
one-tier board model to the German two-tier board). 
10. See Florian Stamm, A Comparative Study of MonitorinH of ManaiTement in German 
and U.S. Corporations After Sarbanes-Oxley: Where Are the German Enrons, WorldComs, and 
Tycos?, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 813 (2004). 
11. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEl;AL STlJl). 233,252 (2002). 
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explains how these components will improve corporate governance 
in America. 
A. Two-Tier Board Structure 
One major difference between American and German business 
models is the structure of a corporation's board of governance. 12 The 
one-tier board, which has been adopted by a majority of European 
countries and the United States, has roots stretching back to the 
structures of European companies incorporated in the 17'h century.13 
The one-tier board includes both executive directors who manage 
the business of the corporation and non-executive directors who 
indirectly oversee management of the corporation and involve 
themselves in only the corporation's major transactions. 14 The 
executive directors hire corporate officers (such as president, vice-
president and treasurer) to manage the corporation's day-to-day 
activities. 15 
The two-tier model has an upper tier, the supervisory board, 
which oversees a lower tier of management composed of senior 
executives. 16 Unlike the one-tier board, the German supervisory 
board typically has no authority even in major transactions of the 
corporation, although specific transactions may be subject to the 
approval of the supervisory board if the articles of the corporation so 
provide. 17 Because of its supervisory nature, members are excluded 
from the management board. This exclusion gives the German board 
an advantage over the self-supervising relationship between the non-
executive and the executive directors in the American one-tier board. 
There are two major differences between the two-tier board and 
one-tier boards. First, because the board of directors oversees the 
senior executives who are often the executive directors themselves, 
12. Owen, supra note 2, at 175. 
13. KJaus J. Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe: Recent Developments of 
Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Ita~y, 
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 18,2004), available at 
http://ssrn.C<lIn/abstract=487944. 
14. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(.1) (1999) (stating that business and affairs of every 
corporation "shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may 
otherwise provided in this c1upter or in its certificate of incorporation"); MODEL Bus. CORP. 
ACT § 8.0 I (1984) (stating that all corporation powers "shall be exercised by or under the 
authority of its boards of directors ... "). 
I S. Owen, supra note 2, at 172. 
16. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 5. 
17. Id. 
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the one-tier board provides opportunities for self-dealing. IH For 
example, Ken Lay was both CEO and chairman of the board of 
directors of Enron, which created an atmosphere of inadequate 
oversight. It) The two-tier board structure excludes all executives from 
its supervisory board and thus the supervisory board cannot become 
directly involved in managing the company.20 This separated 
structure and its associated efficiencies, now adopted in many 
European countries, allows tor more independent supervision of the 
management.21 Another advantage of the two-tier structure is 
procedural efficiency. For instance, the supervisory board can hold 
private meetings for matters such as management compliance and 
compensation. 22 The separate supervisory board structure offers 
advantages compared to that of the combined one-tier board such as 
a clearer scope of duties and a better application of any measures of a 
director's independence.23 The smaller size of the supervisory board 
also facilitates compliance with the British "independence test"24 or 
American civil and criminal liabilities laws.25 
One weakness of the American system is difficultly in 
enforcement of liabilities laws. The recent repetition of Enron-type 
scandals in companies across the American markets demonstrated 
that American liabilities laws did not deter "arrogant, greedy, selfish 
and heartless" executives from violating their fiduciary duties.26 
Additionally, rules excluding executive directors from compensation 
committees or including a majority of independent directors on the 
one-tier board are criticized as being both ineffective and a cause of 
the public's "distrust of corporate managers. ,,27 This is arguably 
because independent directors will "rarely if ever act to change the 
management."n Adoption of the German two-tier board structure 
18. Owen, supra note 2, at 185. 
19. Id. at 185 n.12l. 
20. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 5. 
2l. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Owen, supra note 2, at 184. 
24. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 12, at 13 (listing seven indicators of director's 
independence trom British Combined Code). 
25. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.33 (2003). 
26. Wilber, supra note 5. 
27. Martin Lipton, Corporate GIIJ'crnance in the AiTe of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. Pl\. 
L. REV. I, 49 (1987) (noting that the American Law Institute's approach to corporate 
governance continues to retlect distrust of corporate managers). 
28. Altred F. Conard, Comparatil'e Law: The SupenJision 11' Corporate ManalTement: A 
Comparison of Developments in European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. 1,. 
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will be a signifIcant step toward a truly independent supervisory 
board and will help overcome problems with conflicts of interest. 
B. Audit System 
Compared to other countries' auditing systems, the German 
system has a number of significant advantages. The primary 
advantage is that the two-tier structure allows the German 
supervisory board to have complete independence in performing its 
audits. The German audit system strikes a balance between the 
Italian version of the two-tier model and the British and American 
one-tier models. 
Italian corporate law takes audits for listed companies very 
seriously.29 It mandates that the supervisory board serve an internal 
auditing function while the management board runs the company.30 
In the United States, Enron's collapse exposed the conflicts of 
interest involved in corporate auditing and prompted the enactment 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 31 The Act does not change the board 
structure, but focuses on protecting investors by "improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the 
securities laws,,,32 including the empowerment and protection of 
whistleblowers.33 Even so, the criminal liability provided in the Act 
to punish whistle blower retaliators is "in some ways more limited 
than the corresponding civil liability provisions. ,,34 
In Britain, legislators proposed removal of the shareholders' 
power to choose auditors and fix their remuneration, giving this 
power instead to their one-tier board.35 Hence, British rules create a 
potential conflict of interest in which the directors have power to 
REV. 1459, 1472 (1984) (stating that a director "must be willing to take on the unpleasant 
assignments that can go with the position, such as getting rid of incompetent management," 
and that "ltjhe ultimate protest ofa director, of course, is to resign trom the board"). 
29. Legislative Decree No. 58 (Feb. 24,1998); Gazz. Ult: No. 71 (Mar. 26,1998). An 
English translation of the law is available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/ 
test<)~unic<)~eng.pdf 
30. Id. art. 149. 
31. SelignlJn, supra note 4, at 515~16. 
32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 pmb!., Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002). 
33. Id. § 1107. 
34. Dennis Riock & Jonathan Hoft~ Whistleb/owers Protection Under The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 2003, at 2, al!ailable at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/ 
article /Ri, )ckH, )006260 3. pdf 
35. Secretary of State t,)r Trade and Industry, Modernising Company Law, Presented to 
Parliament by Command of Her M~ljesty (July 2002). 
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hire and fire auditors who would audit the directors themselves or 
their fellow board members. 
By contrast, in the German two-tier board model, the 
supervisory board handles the audit completely and exclusively.36 
Auditors submit their report directly to the supervisory board and 
participate in meetings concerning approval of annual accounts. 37 
This structure ensures a truly independent audit process by 
eliminating potential conflicts of interest. The German audit system 
also maintains the auditing report's contldentiality and preserves any 
evidence of managerial misbehavior. 3H 
One concern with the German system is that exclusion of the 
supervisory board from management may limit its right to obtain 
information directly and prevent members from developing an 
"objective picture of the company's performance.,,3<J This concern is 
based on the mistaken assumption that obtaining information 
directly from the management board is the only way to learn about a 
company's performance. To the contrary, board members can glean 
information regarding company performance through due diligence 
and regular meetings with employees, corporate auditors, customers, 
government auditors, suppliers, or creditors and can exercise 
significant control over the flow of information by simply being 
actively involved.40 
Adoption of the German audit system would help eliminate 
potential conflicts of interest inherent in the American system by 
allowing for an independent audit. Concerns about the supervisory 
board's limited right of access to company information may be 
overcome through the board's active oversight or by increasing 
board authority as explained below. 
III. COMPONENTS OF THE GERMAN MODEL TO BE AVOIDED 
Despite the advantages afforded by the German corporate 
governance model, there have been several attempts in Germany to 
adopt the American one-tier model. 41 For example, Joseph 
Ackermann, the leader of Deutsche Bank, which has operations in 
36. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 10. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 6-8. 
39. [d. at 9. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. at 9-10. 
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the United States, has diverged from the two-tier model by taking 
posItIons on both the supervisory and executive boards. 42 
Nevertheless, mainstream European corporate governance continues 
to move toward elimination of mandated employee board 
participation and a clearer distinction between the two tiers of the 
corporate board.43 As discussed above, this Comment concurs with 
the general European trend and suggests that the American board 
should adopt the two-tier structure and the German auditing system. 
However, it should diverge from the German model by increasing 
the authority of its supervisory board and eliminating employee 
participation. 
A. Supervisory Board Authority 
There are two concerns with the authority of the supervisory 
board in the German two-tier board model. The first, as addressed in 
Part II, is the limitation of the supervisory board's right to 
information regarding company performance. Without sufficient 
information, the supervisory board may not have enough power to 
take a stand against the management.44 Paradoxically, the second 
concern revolves around the possibility that the supervisory board 
will wield too much power-a balance of power that can negatively 
interfere with management's business judgment.45 While the balance 
of power should be continually assessed, the best way to resolve 
concerns regarding supervisory board authority is by granting it 
increased authority. 
Although the supervisory board can access essential information 
from various parties external to the corporation, without a formal 
grant of power from the legislature it may encounter significant 
resistance from these entities. A greater extension of power will 
42. Ackermann's application of the American concepts of executive compensation to the 
German system brought him into the center of Germany's most high-profile corruption case in 
decades. SeeMa1l1zcsmannDefendantsNotGuilzy.British Broad. Corp. (22 July, 2004), 
aJlailable at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3915717.stm (reporting bonus payments 
worth $74 million (£40 million) to executives); see also Igor Reichlin, On Trial: Whither 
Germany' The Trial of Detttsche Rank CEO Ackermann Reflects a Battle Oller Whether German 
Companies Can Rccome More Global, The Chief Executive, Dec. 2003, available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1GI-111737855.html. 
43. See, e,a., Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 16-18. 
44. Id. at 9. 
45. Aste, supra note 9, at 36 (reciting Paul Le Cannu's concern that the "power 
imbalance" between the two boards resulted from the supervisory board's greater power over 
the management). 
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enable it to extract all information necessary to effectively carry out 
its audit function. Whereas a lack of explicit authority may 
discourage cooperation between the supervisory board and the 
previously mentioned entities, a formal grant of power would serve 
to enhance collaborative efforts between the supervisory board and 
those entities privy to important information. 
Additionally, though purported to be strictly separate from 
corporate management, the lack of suHicient authority in the 
German model may render the German supervisory board a mere 
"Potemkin Village," similar to the purported independence of 
American board directors.46 In fact, Gerd Weisskirchen, a senior 
legislator of the German Social Democratic Party, commented on 
the 2008 Volkswagen corporate corruption scandal: "We're in a 
painful transition from the old corporate Germany toward one with a 
new face.,,47 Referring to the alignment of the German corporate 
governance model with the American one-tier board model, the 
"new face," as the Director of the Volkswagen Center for 
Automotive Research predicted,4X would be a Potemkin fa<;ade made 
of ineffective independent directors and would "block judicial 
control of mismanagement. ,,49 
When greater power is bestowed upon the supervisory board, 
the second concern that it has too much authority becomes 
paramount. But a system of checks and balances adequately resolves 
this concern.50 Indeed, governments could more effectively 
implement these checks and balances under a separate two-tier 
structure where the supervisory board has authority independent 
from the executives, so that executives do not otherwise "set, mark, 
and report on their own exam papers."Sl 
Nevertheless, American proponents of the one-tier board model 
46. Conard, supra note 28, at 1468 (citing Victor Brudney, The Independent Directors: 
Heavenly Ci~y or Potemkin Villacqe? 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597 (1982)). "Heavenly City" is an 
allusion to the dream of a rational society, while "Potemkin Village" is an allusion to false 
facades constructed by General Potemkin to please Catherine the Great in her tours of the 
countryside. Id. 
47. Mark Landler, German Court Returns First Jail Term in VW Corruption Scandal, 
INT'L HERALD TIUB., Feb. 22, 2008, http://w\\.w.iht.com/articles/2008/02/22/business/ 
vw.php. 
48. Id. (citing the director's fear that they were not addressing the underlying issues). 
49. Conard, supra note 28, at 1468. 
50. Owen,supranote2,at 184. 
51. Roberto Herrera-Lim, The Case jiJr Two-Tier Boards in the Modern Corporation, 
Securities and Exchange Commission of PakistJn (2009), aJ'ailable at 
http://w\\ow.sec.gov.pk/rc/RoleOfDi rect, lfS/CaseT \\'0-Tier B, lards. pdf. 
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consider the two-tier model outdated. 52 For instance, in a 1997 
corporate symposium, Patrick Speeckaert, then Managing Director 
of the International Division of Morrow & Company, stated that 
"European corporate governance is where American corporate 
governance was five to seven years ago. ,,53 Regardless of whether Mr. 
Speeckaert's perception was based on the two-tier board model as a 
whole or, more specifically, its mandatory employee participation, he 
was unsuccessful in personally proving the superiority of the one-tier 
board model due to his own corporate failures. 54 
Although valid concerns regarding authority of the supervisory 
board in the German two-tier model exist, a robust system of checks 
and balances is an effective deterrent against the threat of too much 
power. At the same time, this system allows for the increased 
authority necessary for the supervisory board to effectively carry out 
its auditing function. 55 Even though a system of checks and balances 
is theoretically possible within the framework of the American one-
tier model, the German two-tier board model, where real authority is 
reserved for the upper tier, is likely a better conduit for the effective 
implementation of a balanced system of power distribution. 
B. Employee Participation 
The German board model allows employee partIcIpation in 
corporate governance. The United States would be wise to avoid 
such schemes. In Germany, employees participate in corporate 
governance by electing half of the members of the upper-tier board 
of directors. 56 This type of employee participation or worker 
consultation can facilitate the t10w of information needed for an 
independent advisory board,57 thereby making it more effective. 
However, this system would not work well in the United States due 
52. See, ceq., Patrick Speeckaert, Corporate G()J7ernance in Europe, 2 FOIU)HAM FIN. SEC. 
& TAX L. FOIWM 31 (1997). 
53. Id. 
54. See Odyssey Pictures Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Dec. 27, 2004), 
al'ailable at http://w\\w.secint().com/dI2PMe.llz.htm. Until Speeckaert's 2004 resignation 
as director "without comment," Odyssey sufiered a number of tinancial setbacks. Odyssey 
Pictures Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 15, 2008), available at 
http://\\,ww.secint().com/d 13Ka8.tl.htm?Find=Speeckaert&Line =258#Line258. 
55. Herrer,l- Lim, supra note 51. 
56. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History jiJr Corporate 
LaJV, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 445 (2001). 
57. DIRK VAN GERVEN & PAUL STORM, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY 17 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1st ed. 2006) (noting the structural effects of employee participation). 
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to its business culture and labor policies such as employment-at-will 
and collective bargaining.ox 
Some observers have criticized the ineffectiveness of labor 
participation in corporate governance. 5\1 Others have predicted that 
participation will become a European trend, as many European states 
are satisfied with labor's involvement. 60 The European Union 
Directive deals with the split by leaving decisions on labor 
participation to individual states. 61 
A country's history and culture create different priorities in its 
legal system. for instance, German employee participation in 
corporate governance and unionism is deeply ingrained in the 
country's culture, with historical roots dating back to the Weimar 
Republic of thel920s.62 In the United States, on the other hand, a 
system has developed that includes shareholders and lenders in its 
corporate governance.63 U.S. corporations must also embrace a 
national free-market economyM and a flexible labor law system, 
which allows an employer to dismiss an employee at any time for "a 
good reason, a bad reason, or for no reason at all. ,,65 
Thus, in the American system, employees do not have voting 
rights in the corporation unless they themselves are shareholders. A 
lack of equity interest excludes employees from voting in the 
corporate general election in order to ensure the integrity of 
corporate governance. As such, mandated employee participation in 
electing the board would not mesh with American free market 
principles. Finally, required employee participation would conflict 
58. Tom Werner, The Common Law Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Current Exceptions 
jilr 101M Employees, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 291, 293 (1994). 
59. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 22 (citing recent scandals in F.R.G. as evidence of 
co-determination as ineffective both as a guarantee against excessive remuneration of 
management and as a safeguard against costly strikes). 
60. Hildegard Waschke, Workers' Participation in ManalJement in the Nine European 
Community Countries, 2 COMP. LAB. L. 83,101 (1977) (describing workers' participation in 
management in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom); see Dieter Sadowski, Joachim Junkes & Sabine 
Lindenthal, Employees and Corporate Governance: Germany: the German Model '!f' Corporate & 
Labor Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POl.'Y J. 33,66 (2000) (stating that codetermination 
may promote positive changes). 
61. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 22 (observing that the 5'" Directive leaves the 
decision on labor participation to member states' discretion). 
62. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 56, at 444. 
63. Stamm, supra note 10, at 834. 
64. See Marleen O'Connor, Labor's Role in the American Corporate GOl'ernance 
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'y J. 97 (2000). 
65. Werner, supra note 58. 
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with U.S. labor laws that allow corporations to fire an employee for 
any non-discriminatory reason. Employers might exercise this power 
to control whether and which employees actually participated in 
corporate governance. 
Several countries have discovered that employee and labor union 
partiCIpation in corporate governance cannot coexist. Italian, 
Belgian, and french unions came to suspect that employee 
participation diluted their unions' impact on management.66 In the 
United States, employee participation attracted attention in the 
1970s, when adversarial unionism lost its role in dealing with labor 
contracting.67 The attention soon waned, but, unlike calls for 
employee participation, unions did not disappear. 68 Indeed, they 
maintain a significant role in contractual negotiations and collective 
bargaining.69 
Unions and employees participating in corporate governance 
affect each other in a variety of ways. First, employee participation 
undermines the role of the union if an employee can work in tandem 
with the boss on corporate governance issues without union 
involvement. Second, the union may taint the independence of 
employee board members because they may "qualifY as being free 
from any direct business relationship but are bound to the union's 
members, i.e. the employees.,,7o 
Although the employee participation system has a unique 
historical significance in Germany, its application to American 
corporate governance is complicated by differences in American 
culture and labor policy concepts. Furthermore, the potential 
conflicts inherent in employee union affiliations may harm rather 
than benefit the American board's independence. Accordingly, the 
United States should avoid adopting the employee participation 
aspects of the German board model. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As Paul Davis has observed: "There is no 'one best' system of 
corporate governance. Rather, each system has different 
66. Waschke, supra, note 60, at 97. 
67. See O'Connor, supra note 64. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 22 (stating that these members would not pass 
the directors' indepeI1lknce test). 
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advantages."71 Compared to the existing U.S.one-tier model, the 
German two-tier board better equips the supervisory board to check 
and balance corporate management. The German audit system is 
superior because it produces an authentic picture of company 
performance without any conflict of interests. Despite these two 
distinct advantages, the German supervisory board does not have 
enough authority to ensure its independence. The German model 
also mandates employee participation, which would likely not work 
in the American business environment. For these reasons, the United 
States should adopt the German two-tier board structure and its 
audit system but should avoid German policies of limited supervisory 
board authority and employee participation in corporate governance. 
By implementing these aspects of the German system, the American 
corporate governance system could more properly balance the many 
competing interests necessary to secure a corporation's success. 
71. Paul Davies, Employee Representation & Corporate Law RejiJrm: A Comment from 
the United Kingdom, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'y J. 135, 136 (2000). 
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